The Confusing Standards for Discretionary Review in Washington and a Proposed Framework for Clarity by Dwyer, Judge Stephen
  91
The Confusing Standards for Discretionary Review in 
Washington and a Proposed Framework for Clarity 
Judge Stephen J. Dwyer, Leonard J. Feldman, and  
Hunter Ferguson* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It has now been more than thirty-five years since the Washington 
Rules of Appellate Procedure (RAP) became effective in 1976 and re-
placed all prior rules governing appellate procedure. One significant 
change that those rules made was to clearly describe and delineate a pro-
cedural mechanism for seeking interlocutory review of trial court deci-
sions. Specifically, RAP 2.1(a) divided appeals into two categories: (1) 
review as a matter of right, called “appeal”; and (2) review of interlocu-
tory orders by permission of the appellate court, called “discretionary 
review.”1 RAP 2.3(b), in turn, specifically states various “considerations” 
that govern acceptance of discretionary review of superior court deci-
sions.2 Relevant here, subsection (b)(1) permits discretionary review if 
“[t]he superior court has committed obvious error which would render 
further proceedings useless,” and subsection (b)(2) permits such review 
if “[t]he superior court has committed probable error and the decision of 
the superior court substantially alters the status quo or substantially limits 
the freedom of a party to act.”3 
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 1. WASH. R. APP. P. 2.1(a). 
 2. WASH. R. APP. P. 2.3(b). Discretionary review of decisions of the superior court sitting in an 
appellate capacity is governed by WASH. R. APP. P. 2.3(d). The application of that rule is beyond the 
scope of this Article. 
 3. WASH. R. APP. P. 2.3(b)(1), (b)(2). As can be seen, both subsections have two prongs: RAP 
2.3(b)(1) has an “obvious error” prong and a “useless proceedings” prong, and RAP 2.3(b)(2) has a 
“probable error” prong and a “status quo or freedom to act” prong. Id. 
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The Task Force comment that accompanied RAP 2.1 explains that 
the changes to the process for seeking interlocutory review of trial court 
decisions were made because “[r]eview by way of extraordinary writ 
under the former rules has been the most confusing of all appellate pro-
cedures, and precedent for almost any arguable position can be found.”4 
The question addressed in this Article is whether that confounding condi-
tion has changed for the better. Is the process for seeking discretionary 
review clearer today than it was before the RAP became effective? Or is 
there once again precedent for almost any arguable position? If the an-
swer to the latter question is “yes,” then Washington appellate courts 
have some work to do to clarify these rules and procedures. 
The changes to RAP 2.3(b)(1) and (b)(2) should be beneficial. The 
mechanics of seeking discretionary review are now well defined and un-
derstandable: the rules clearly state how litigants are to seek discretion-
ary review. Likewise, the considerations governing discretionary review 
are also clear. In an influential article on discretionary review, former 
Washington Supreme Court Clerk Geoffrey Crooks appropriately recog-
nizes that RAP 2.3(b)(2) is applicable “only when a trial court’s order 
has immediate effects outside the courtroom.”5 Crooks goes on to state 
that “[t]his interpretation of the ‘status quo’ test and ‘freedom of a party 
to act’ test would fit with the notion that subsection (b)(2) was intended 
to focus on injunctions and the like.”6 That is, it applies to rulings that 
have the effect of doing something other than merely resolving an issue 
in the litigation. 
Unfortunately, the Washington Appellate Practice Deskbook tells a 
different story. The Deskbook recognizes, at the outset, that the Task 
Force comment regarding RAP 2.3(b)(2) indicates that it “is primarily 
directed to orders pertaining to injunctions, attachments, receiverships, 
and arbitration.”7 But the Deskbook authors go on to state that this “lim-
ited view is misleading; this ground has been used to address a broad 
range of decisions that affect the course of litigation but may not affect 
the case on the merits.”8 Then, at the conclusion of this discrete discus-
sion, the authors note Crooks’s contrary view.9 Making matters worse, 
                                                 
 4. 2A KARL B. TEGLAND, WASHINGTON PRACTICE: RULES PRACTICE 86 (7th ed. 2011). The 
Task Force comments are explanatory comments written by the drafters of the RAP prior to the 
adoption of the rules. Id. 
 5. Geoffrey Crooks, Discretionary Review of Trial Court Decisions Under the Washington 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1541, 1546 (1986). 
 6. Id. 
 7. 1 WASH. STATE BAR ASS’N, WASHINGTON APPELLATE PRACTICE DESKBOOK 10-10 (2011). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
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not only are there differing interpretations of the considerations govern-
ing discretionary review, but the decision whether to grant or deny dis-
cretionary review has largely been made by court commissioners in un-
published orders, so there is little published case law or other guidance to 
resolve this debate.10 
The ultimate effect on practitioners is both obvious and unavoida-
ble. Many lawyers, rather than stake out a clear position regarding the 
applicability of the various considerations governing discretionary re-
view, simply argue that any and every consideration that is even arguably 
applicable is satisfied by the trial court’s determination. The appellate 
court commissioner can then simply choose from the available options 
and grant or deny discretionary review if the commissioner concludes 
that such review is warranted. This approach creates continued uncertain-
ty and may cause litigants with meritorious petitions for review to not 
request such relief (given the cost of doing so and uncertain application 
of the applicable standards), while litigants with undeserving petitions 
for review (but greater resources) request such relief because there is no 
clear indication that such relief will be denied. Thus, there is a compel-
ling need for clarity. 
The remainder of this Article is organized as follows: In Part II.A, 
we survey Washington case law applying RAP 2.3(b)(1) and (b)(2) 
standards. In Part II.B, we apply basic principles of statutory interpreta-
tion to the RAP, as well as consider the legislative history of the rule to 
evaluate this precedent. Based on our analysis, we conclude that subsec-
tions (b)(1) and (b)(2) should properly apply to distinct situations and 
that review under subsection (b)(2) should be granted only in the context 
of a court order having immediate effects outside the judicial process, 
such as a preliminary injunction, an order requiring disclosure of privi-
leged communications, or an order to divulge a trade secret or other con-
fidential information. We also explain that an alternative reading—one 
that applies subsection (b)(2) to partial summary judgment or evidentiary 
rulings—would render subsection (b)(1) unnecessary. Further, we ex-
plain that our suggested approach would bring Washington jurisprudence 
in line with federal standards governing interlocutory review. Part III 
briefly concludes. 
                                                 
 10. For the past several years, panels of judges on Division One of the Washington Court of 
Appeals have been deciding some motions for discretionary review of superior court decisions and 
all petitions for discretionary review of decisions by courts of limited jurisdiction. These orders have 
uniformly been, and continue to be, unpublished. 
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II. ANALYSIS 
A. Washington Courts’ Inconsistent Application of  
RAP 2.3(b)(1) and (b)(2) 
One of the earliest examples of a Washington court blurring the dis-
tinction between RAP 2.3(b)(1) and (b)(2) is found in Glass v. Stahl Spe-
cialty Co.11 In Glass, the plaintiff brought a product liability claim 
against a manufacturer of industrial equipment that injured the plaintiff 
during the course of his employment.12 The equipment manufacturer 
moved for leave to amend its answer to include a third-party claim for 
contribution against the plaintiff’s employer on the basis that the em-
ployer, if negligent, could be held jointly and severally liable under the 
recently enacted Tort Reform Act.13 The trial court granted the manufac-
turer’s motion, and the employer moved for summary judgment, arguing 
that the employee had already received industrial insurance benefits.14 
The trial court denied the employer’s motion and directed that this ruling 
be treated as a “final judgment” under Washington Superior Court Civil 
Rule (CR) 54(b).15 In so doing, the trial court observed that the employer 
“would sustain a hardship in having to participate in the litigation of this 
case, pending a resolution of the novel legal question” of contribution.16 
The Washington Supreme Court declined to review the trial court’s 
order as a final judgment under CR 54(b), but it granted discretionary 
review, explaining, “[W]e have determined the trial court committed ob-
vious or probable error.”17 This statement suggests that both subsection 
(b)(1) (obvious error) and (b)(2) (probable error) apply to a pretrial rul-
ing that does not command some action or restrict conduct outside the 
subject judicial proceedings. Perhaps the court applied subsection (b)(2) 
because the Tort Reform Act was relatively new and the trial court’s er-
ror was not “obvious.” But the court made no effort to explain how the 
ruling satisfied the status quo or freedom to act prong of subsection 
                                                 
 11. Glass v. Stahl Specialty Co., 652 P.2d 948 (Wash. 1982). 
 12. Id. at 949. 
 13. Id. (citing WASH. REV. CODE. § 4.22.040 (1982)). 
 14. Id. at 949. 
 15. Id. at 949–50. WASH. SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 54(b) provides, in pertinent part:  
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, coun-
terclaim, cross claim, or third party claim, . . . the court may direct the entry of final 
judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims . . . only upon an express de-
termination in the judgment, supported by written findings, that there is no just reason for 
delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. 
 16. Id. at 950 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 17. Id. 
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(b)(2).18 One possible explanation is that the trial court’s decision altered 
the status quo and limited the employer’s freedom to act by requiring the 
employer to participate in the litigation. But that is the outcome for any 
party that loses a dispositive motion, and it does not seem proper to apply 
the less rigorous “probable error” standard of subsection (b)(2) to all 
such rulings. Were it so, there would be no reason for the more stringent 
subsection (b)(1) standard. 
The Court of Appeals perpetuated this confusion in Walden v. City 
of Seattle.19 There, plaintiffs instituted a class action against the City of 
Seattle and certain officials and officers of the Seattle Police Department, 
asserting excessive and deadly force claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as 
well as various state law tort claims.20 After the trial court certified the 
class, the defendants moved for summary judgment on several issues, 
including that they were immune from the § 1983 claims under federal 
law.21 The trial court denied this motion, and the defendants subsequent-
ly filed a notice of appeal from the § 1983 immunity ruling and a motion 
for discretionary review on the remaining summary judgment issues.22 
The Court of Appeals concluded that the Washington Rules of Appellate 
Procedure—not federal decisional law—governed the defendants’ right 
to seek interlocutory review, and these rules should be “liberally applied” 
to “ensure full and adequate protection of federal immunity rights.”23 The 
court then ruled that “in these limited circumstances, we will grant dis-
cretionary review under RAP 2.3(b)(1) or (2) if obvious or probable error 
is shown regardless of whether the error renders ‘further proceedings 
useless’ or ‘substantially alters the status quo or substantially limits the 
freedom of a party to act.’”24 
The problem with the approach to RAP 2.3 in Walden is that it fails 
to explain how the useless proceedings prong of subsection (b)(1) and 
the status quo or freedom to act prong of subsection (b)(2) are satisfied.25 
Certainly, if the defendants were immune from suit further proceedings 
would be useless, just as proceedings are useless where there is a lack of 
jurisdiction or claims are time-barred. Yet this opinion suggests that 
demonstration of “probable error” under subsection (b)(2) is sufficient to 
                                                 
 18. Id. 
 19. Walden v. City of Seattle, 892 P.2d 745 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (per curiam). 
 20. Id. at 746. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 748–49. 
 24. Id. (quoting WASH. R. APP. P. 2.3(b)(1), (2)) (emphasis in original). 
 25. The additional issues raised when courts redraft a court rule by decisional fiat are beyond 
the scope of this Article. 
96 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 38:91 
trigger discretionary review when a trial court ruling either requires a 
party to participate in litigation, or affects how a party participates in liti-
gation. But again, if that is the case, why does the “obvious error” stand-
ard in subsection (b)(1) exist? 
Another example of the application of subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2) 
in tandem is found in Bartusch v. Oregon State Board of Higher Educa-
tion.26 There, the Court of Appeals granted review, under both subsection 
(b)(1) and (b)(2), of a trial court order denying a motion to dismiss for 
lack of jurisdiction.27 The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court 
lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant and directed dismissal of 
the case on remand.28 Acceptance of review under subsection (b)(1) 
made perfect sense here because the jurisdictional facts were undisputed 
and clearly did not support application of Washington’s long-arm statute. 
In the absence of jurisdiction, further proceedings would have been use-
less. 
It is entirely unclear why the court also granted review under sub-
section (b)(2). Although meeting the “obvious error” standard of subsec-
tion (b)(1) would seem to satisfy the “probable error” standard of subsec-
tion (b)(2), it is not clear how the trial court’s order altered the status quo 
or substantially limited the freedom of a party to act. The only way to 
read the court’s ruling is that an order allowing litigation to proceed 
“substantially alters the status quo” or “substantially limits the freedom 
of a party to act” because the party must continue to participate in the 
litigation. But that is obviously true of the denial of any dispositive mo-
tion where an arguable case for probable error can be made. Here again, 
this application of subsection (b)(2) obviates any need to seek review 
based on the more stringent “obvious error” and “useless proceeding” 
standard of subsection (b)(1). 
McKee v. Martin29 also illustrates the courts’ tendency to apply 
subsection (b)(2) to pretrial rulings without explaining how the status 
quo or freedom to act prong is met. In McKee, a court commissioner ac-
cepted discretionary review, under subsection (b)(2), of a partial sum-
mary judgment ruling.30 The case involved an auto accident where the 
defendant was collaterally estopped from “arguing or presenting evi-
dence” that he did not violate the rules of the road because a municipal 
court found in a separate proceeding that he had committed a traffic in-
                                                 
 26. Bartusch v. Oregon State Bd. of Higher Educ., 126 P.3d 840, 843 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006). 
 27. Id. at 842–43. 
 28. Id. at 846. 
 29. McKee v. Martin, No. 31696–0–II, 2005 WL 3389650 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2005). 
 30. Id. at *2. 
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fraction in violation of state law.31 In reversing the trial court’s ruling, 
the Court of Appeals explained that application of the collateral estoppel 
doctrine would work an injustice because the small amount of the fine at 
stake in the traffic infraction proceeding did not provide the defendant 
sufficient motivation to litigate the issue before the municipal court, and 
also that the issues presented in the two proceedings were identical.32 
Notwithstanding the Court of Appeals’ decision on the merits, it is un-
clear why subsection (b)(2) was the vehicle for granting discretionary 
review, unless limitations on a litigant’s ability to present certain evi-
dence or arguments at trial are considered a substantial alteration of the 
status quo or a substantial limitation on a party’s freedom to act. But if 
that were true, every evidentiary ruling would be subject to discretionary 
review so long as the probable error standard is met. 
Another example of the application of subsection (b)(2) to a sum-
mary judgment ruling can be found in GMAC v. Everett Chevrolet, Inc.33 
In GMAC, the Court of Appeals granted discretionary review of a trial 
court’s order denying a motion for summary judgment on the defendant 
car dealer’s bad faith counterclaim against its lender.34 The Court of Ap-
peals concluded that the car dealer could not establish a bad faith claim 
based on the underlying contract documents it cited in support of its 
claim, and, further, that the trial court improperly based its decision on a 
contract provision neither pleaded nor argued by the car dealer.35 The 
court then summarily concluded that RAP 2.3(b)(2)’s freedom to act 
prong was satisfied because “[t]he denial of summary judgment under 
these circumstances has substantially limited GMAC’s ability to estab-
lish by summary judgment a proper adjudication of this counterclaim of 
bad faith.”36 But that reasoning is entirely circular: a trial court’s denial 
of a summary judgment motion necessarily prevents the moving party 
from establishing that summary judgment should be granted. If that were 
the standard, then subsection (b)(2)’s freedom to act prong would be 
meaningless and there would be no reason to rely upon subsection (b)(1). 
Minehart v. Morning Star Boys Ranch, Inc.37 further illustrates the 
blurred distinction between subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2). There, the 
Court of Appeals recognized that there is a difference between the two 
                                                 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at *2–3. 
 33. GMAC v. Everett Chevrolet, Inc., No. 68374–8–I, 2012 WL 3939863 (Wash. Ct. App. 
Aug. 16, 2012). 
 34. Id. at *1. 
 35. Id. at *4–6. 
 36. Id. at *6. 
 37. Minehart v. Morning Star Boys Ranch, Inc., 232 P.3d 591 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010). 
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standards, commenting that “there is an inverse relationship between the 
certainty of error and its impact on the trial. Where there is a weaker ar-
gument for error, there must be a stronger showing of harm.”38 Yet in its 
analysis of several evidentiary rulings, the court did little to clarify the 
difference. For instance, in rejecting a request for review of one set of 
evidentiary rulings, the court stated that there were “tenable grounds” for 
the rulings and therefore no showing of either “obvious or probable er-
ror.”39 
The Court of Appeal’s decision in State v. Dickjose40 exemplifies a 
similar application of subsection (b)(2). In Dickjose, a commissioner 
granted discretionary review of a trial court order denying a motion to 
suppress evidence obtained pursuant to an invalid search warrant.41 The 
Court of Appeals agreed with the defendant that the search warrant was 
invalid and reversed the trial court order denying the motion to sup-
press.42 It is unclear why subsection (b)(2) provided a proper basis for 
accepting discretionary review before final judgment. The trial court or-
der did not “substantially alter the status quo” or “substantially limit the 
freedom of a party to act,” unless those criteria are understood to apply to 
rulings affecting a party’s position in litigation—or in this case, a crimi-
nal prosecution. It seems that subsection (b)(1) was the proper avenue to 
seek discretionary review, assuming that admission of the unlawfully 
obtained evidence would have constituted reversible error. Denial of the 
motion to suppress that evidence, therefore, would have “render[ed] fur-
ther proceedings useless.” 
The above discussion is not meant to suggest—nor is it true—that 
Washington appellate courts have persistently misapplied subsections 
(b)(1) and (b)(2). To the contrary, there are a few noteworthy cases that 
properly apply these provisions. In Macias v. Mine Safety Appliances 
Co.,43 for example, the issue on appeal was whether a plaintiff, who de-
veloped mesothelioma after decades of cleaning respirators used in the 
handling of asbestos-laden materials, could assert a failure to warn prod-
uct liability claim against the respirator manufacturers even though the 
respirators he cleaned were not made with asbestos.44 Despite two recent 
rulings of the Washington Supreme Court limiting the duty to warn to 
persons in the chain of distribution of a potentially harmful product, the 
                                                 
 38. Id. at 594. 
 39. Id. at 595. 
 40. State v. Dickjose, No. 39160–1–II, 2011 WL 1005552 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2011). 
 41. Id. at *4. 
 42. Id. at *1. 
 43. Macias v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 244 P.3d 978 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010). 
 44. Id. at 979–80. 
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trial court denied the respirator manufacturers’ motion for summary 
judgment.45 A commissioner for the Court of Appeals subsequently 
granted discretionary review on the ground that the trial court had com-
mitted obvious error.46 Applying controlling precedent, the Court of Ap-
peals reversed and ordered that summary judgment be entered on re-
mand.47 
Discretionary review under subsection (b)(1) of the order denying 
summary judgment was warranted in Macias because the trial court 
failed to follow controlling precedent (committing “obvious error”), and 
the respirator manufacturers were entitled to judgment as a matter of law, 
regardless of further developments in the litigation—rendering further 
proceedings useless. Other examples of the proper application of subsec-
tion (b)(1) to rulings regarding summary judgment abound.48 Additional-
ly, Washington courts have appropriately applied subsection (b)(1) to 
rulings denying motions for voluntary dismissal,49 as well as rulings on 
                                                 
 45. Id. at 980. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 987. 
 48. See, e.g., Douchette v. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403, 818 P.2d 1362, 1363 (Wash. 1991); Hart-
ley v. State, 698 P.2d 77, 81 (Wash. 1985) (specifically explaining that “[a] useless lawsuit would be 
prevented by a decision in favor of dismissing the State and County as defendants”); Sea-Pac Co. v. 
United Food & Commercial Workers Local Union 44, 699 P.2d 217, 218 (Wash. 1985); Shannon v. 
State, 40 P.3d 1200, 1202 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (explaining in appeal from denial of summary 
judgment even though statutory pleading requirements were not met: “We ordinarily will not review 
a denial of a motion for summary judgment. But an appellate court will accept discretionary review 
if the trial court ‘committed an obvious error which would render further proceedings useless.’”); 
Dussault v. Seattle Pub. Sch., 850 P.2d 581, 583 n.1 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993) (explaining that while 
denial of a summary judgment motion is not an appealable order, discretionary review may be grant-
ed under subsection (b)(1) to avoid a useless trial); McDonald v. Moore, 790 P.2d 213, 216 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 1990) (reversing summary judgment ruling in will contest presenting issue of first impres-
sion in Washington); Rye v. Seattle Times Co., 678 P.2d 1282, 1289 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984) (revers-
ing denial of summary judgment in defamation action against newspaper and reporter for lack of 
affirmative evidence of malice). 
 49. See Baker v. Kotlik, No. 51128–9–I, 2003 WL 731834, at *1–2 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 3, 
2003) (reversing order granting motion to dismiss because plaintiff sought voluntary dismissal under 
WASH. SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 41 before hearing on motion to dismiss); King Cnty. Council v. King 
Cnty. Pers. Bd., 716 P.2d 322, 322–23 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) (same). 
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motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim,50 lack of jurisdiction,51 and 
expiration of the applicable limitation period.52 
As a corollary to this application of subsection (b)(1), some Wash-
ington court rulings, consistent with Crooks’s view, have indicated that 
subsection (b)(2) applies to orders having immediate impacts outside of 
the subject court proceedings. The recent decision in Filo Foods LLC v. 
City of SeaTac53 illustrates this application of subsection (b)(2). In Filo 
Foods, supporters of an initiative to raise the minimum wage for certain 
workers within the city of SeaTac sought discretionary review of a trial 
court ruling that “removed [the initiative] . . . from the ballot, depriving 
the voters of SeaTac the opportunity to vote for or against it.”54 This rul-
ing, the court explained, altered the status quo because the initiative 
would have been on the ballot otherwise.55 The court properly granted 
discretionary review under subsection (b)(2), and its ruling makes sense 
when one considers the limited opportunity for an election. Other types 
of rulings properly reviewed under this rule include preliminary injunc-
tions,56 rulings regarding arbitration,57 rulings regarding custody orders,58 
and rulings requiring interpleader.59 At least one court has appropriately 
suggested that subsection (b)(2) is limited to these types of rulings.60 
                                                 
 50. See, e.g., Long v. Dugan, 788 P.2d 1, 1–2 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (dismissal for failure to 
state a claim because wrongful death statute does not create a right of action for nondependent sur-
viving siblings). 
 51. See, e.g., Vannausdle v. Pierce Cnty. Dep’t of Assigned Counsel, No. 36440–9–II, 2009 
WL 1060399, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2009) (finding lack of personal jurisdiction because 
plaintiff failed to effect service). 
 52. See, e.g., Barfield v. Estate of Barfield, No. 51884–4–1, 2003 WL 21055110, at *1 (Wash. 
Ct. App. May 12, 2003) (reversing denial of summary judgment where it was undisputed that suit 
was filed after expiration of limitation period). 
 53. Filo Foods LLC v. City of SeaTac, 319 P.3d 817 (2014). 
 54. Id. at 819. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See, e.g., Speelman v. Bellingham/Whatcom Cnty. Hous. Auths., 273 P.3d 1035, 1039 
(Wash. Ct. App. 2012) (review of emergency preliminary injunction); Ameriquest Mortgage v. State 
Att’y Gen., 199 P.3d 468, 472–73 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009) (review of denial of motion for prelimi-
nary injunction). 
 57. See, e.g., Adler v. Manor, 103 P.3d 773, 778–79 (Wash. 2005) (involving review of an 
order compelling arbitration pursuant to unconscionable agreement). 
 58. See, e.g., Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Paulos, 270 P.3d 607, 613–14 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2012) (involving review order removing child from placement with grandparents). 
 59. Danjel Enters., LLC v. Valdez, No. 63267–1–I, 2010 WL 3214556, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. 
Aug. 16, 2010) (involving review of an order requiring an escrow agent to deposit funds into court 
registry). 
 60. Woodall v. Avalon Care Ctr.-Fed. Way, LLC, 231 P.3d 1252, 1261 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010) 
(observing that “[o]rders pertaining to arbitration are among the types of orders that fall within the 
scope of this rule” (citing Crooks, supra note 4, at 1545–46)). 
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Unfortunately, these correctly decided cases61 are eclipsed by doz-
ens of opinions that either blur or ignore the distinction between subsec-
tions (b)(1) and (b)(2).62 As the above discussion illustrates, there are 
numerous instances in which commissioners grant motions for discre-
tionary review of partial summary judgment orders or evidentiary rulings 
under subsection (b)(2). Such rulings reflect a view that subsection (b)(2) 
has essentially swallowed subsection (b)(1). In other matters, courts have 
declined to specify the particular subsection under which they grant or 
deny review.63 As a result, courts, commissioners, and practitioners alike 
are left to confront a substantial increase in the volume of motions for 
discretionary review resulting from the imprecise application of subsec-
tions (b)(1) and (b)(2). The lack of rigor and attendant confusion in ap-
plying subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2) have not gone unnoticed, as courts 
have frequently lamented that discretionary review has been improvi-
dently granted.64 Yet even in these instances, courts have not sought to 
clarify when discretionary review is appropriate under the different 
standards. 
Considering the body of case law applying RAP 2.3(b)(1) and 
(b)(2), one thing is clear: the law is a mess. As noted above, subsection 
(b)(2) appears to focus on injunctions and the like. But despite the plain 
language of the rule and available commentary, Washington courts have 
applied the “probable error” and “substantially alters the status quo or 
substantially limits the freedom to act” standards of subsection (b)(2) to a 
wide range of issues in a seemingly inconsistent manner. As a result, liti-
gants frequently seek discretionary review under subsection (b)(2) of 
run-of-the-mill pre-trial orders, which is directly contrary to the principle 
of the final judgment rule disfavoring piecemeal review.65 To forestall 
                                                 
 61. See supra text accompanying notes 43–60. 
 62. See supra text accompanying notes 11–42. 
 63. See Sunbreaker Condo. Ass’n v. Travelers Ins. Co., 901 P.2d 1079, 1085–86 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 1995) (denying discretionary review of denial of summary judgment without specifying partic-
ular subsection of RAP 2.3(b)); Roth v. Bell, 600 P.2d 602, 609 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) (denying 
discretionary review under RAP 2.3(b) but declining to analyze any particular subsection). 
 64. See, e.g., Eastman v. Puget Sound Builders NW., Inc., No. 42013–9–II, 2012 WL 5349186, 
at *3 (Wash. Ct. App. Sept. 11, 2012); Kantola v. Juvinall, No. 37537–1–II, 2009 WL 1212270, at 
*5 (Wash. Ct. App. May 5, 2009); Brunridge v. Fluor Hanford, Inc., No. 22058–3–III, 2004 WL 
898279, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2004); Taplett v. Major Mktg. Servs., Inc., No. 20112–1–III, 
2002 WL 398492, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2002). 
 65. See Loeffelholz v. C.L.E.A.N., 82 P.3d 1199, 1214 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (“[A] court 
generally must resolve all claims for and against all parties before it enters a final and enforceable 
judgment on any part of the case. The goals are to avoid confusion and piecemeal appeals.”) (inter-
nal footnotes omitted); Minehart v. Morning Star Boys Ranch, Inc., 232 P.3d 591, 593 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 2010) (“Interlocutory review is disfavored. Piecemeal appeals of interlocutory orders must be 
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that trend and bring greater clarity to the standards for when discretion-
ary review is appropriate, Washington appellate courts should elucidate 
the distinction between subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2) and then adhere to 
that distinction. A proposed framework for doing so is described below. 
B. Reassessing the Requirements for Discretionary Review Under  
RAP 2.3(b)(1) and (b)(2) 
RAP 2.3 subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2) need not cause confusion 
among practitioners because there is a logical way to apply them. Courts 
can and should avoid relying on catchall analyses that a party has 
demonstrated either obvious or probable error. Instead, RAP 2.3(b)(2) 
should be limited to trial court orders granting or denying injunctive re-
lief and other orders that impact parties’ rights outside litigation proceed-
ings—as opposed to a party’s position within a case—such as an order 
compelling or refusing to compel arbitration, an order requiring a party 
to return property to another party or preserve property pending the out-
come of litigation, a custody order, or an order requiring the disclosure of 
privileged information or trade secrets. RAP 2.3(b)(1), in turn, should 
apply to orders that affect the litigation, such as an order dismissing a 
claim or defense or an order denying a motion to transfer venue. This 
framework is sensible for numerous reasons, each briefly set forth below. 
First, the proposed framework is consistent with the plain language 
of RAP 2.3(b)(1) and (b)(2). RAP 2.3(b)(1) is expressly limited to pur-
ported errors that “would render further proceedings useless,” whereas 
RAP 2.3(b)(2) is limited to a ruling that “alters the status quo or substan-
tially limits the freedom of a party to act.” The text of subsection (b)(1) 
provides that discretionary review is proper when the error committed is 
so blatant and severe that there is no point to continuing the particular 
litigation, either because further proceedings would require reversal and 
repetition on remand, or because the litigation should be dismissed alto-
gether. 
On its face, subsection (b)(2) applies to orders that immediately 
change the rights of a party or modify some existing condition. A prelim-
inary injunction order, an order transferring custody from one individual 
to another, an order requiring disclosure of privileged information, or an 
order compelling parties to submit to arbitration rather than exercise their 
rights to access a court of law accomplishes each of those things. In con-
trast, CR 12 rulings, discovery orders, summary judgment rulings, and 
                                                                                                             
avoided in the interests of speedy and economical disposition of judicial business.”) (internal quota-
tion marks and citation omitted). 
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most evidentiary rulings do not alter the substantive rights of any party 
with similar effect. Such rulings might be incorrect and warrant recon-
sideration by the trial court or reversal on appeal, but the terms of sub-
section (b)(2), on their face, do not apply to such rulings. 
Second, the proposed framework would preserve the independent 
significance of subsection (b)(1). Subsection (b)(2) should not be inter-
preted to apply to partially dispositive and evidentiary rulings, in part 
because of the interpretive principle that courts are to give effect to lan-
guage in a rule by considering different provisions in relation to one an-
other and harmonizing them.66 Subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2) employ dif-
ferent standards that must apply to different situations. If pretrial orders 
were considered to alter the status quo or substantially limit the freedom 
of a party to act, subsection (b)(1), with its more stringent “obvious er-
ror” standard and requirement that further proceedings be “rendered use-
less,” would be rendered nugatory. 
Third, the proposed framework is consistent with the Task Force 
comments regarding RAP 2.3(b)(1) and (b)(2). As to subsection (b)(1), 
the Task Force observed that the obvious error or useless proceedings 
standard “states the general test established by decisional law” developed 
around applications for extraordinary writs.67 Subsection (b)(2), the Task 
Force explained, “applies primarily to orders pertaining to injunctions, 
attachments, receivers, and arbitration, which have formerly been ap-
pealable as a matter of right.”68 Indeed, Rule 14 of the former Washing-
ton Supreme Court Rules on Appeal provided that rulings granting in-
junctions and similar equitable rulings could be appealed as a matter of 
right. The legislative history, therefore, confirms that subsections (b)(1) 
and (b)(2) pertain to different types of orders. 
Fourth, the proposed framework is consistent with well-reasoned 
case law, including Macias.69 Those cases confirm that pretrial orders 
affecting the course of the litigation with no immediate effects on par-
ties’ rights outside the litigation properly qualify for discretionary review 
only when the subject ruling is obviously incorrect and reversal would 
obviate the need for further proceedings.70 In contrast, non-appealable 
orders or rulings having immediate effect on people’s rights outside the 
litigation are reviewable under the less stringent probable error stand-
                                                 
 66. See State v. Brown, 312 P.3d 1017, 1020 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013) (meaning of a court rule 
“is discerned by reading the rule as a whole, harmonizing its provisions, and using related rules to 
help identify the intent behind it”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 67. TEGLAND, supra note 4, at 201. 
 68. Id. (emphasis added). 
 69. See generally Macias v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 244 P.3d 978 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010). 
 70. See supra text accompanying notes 43–52. 
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ard.71 The reasoning in cases like Macias conforms precisely to the 
framework proposed here, but the teaching of those decisions is eclipsed 
by the many other cases that ignore or blur the proper distinction be-
tween subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2).72 
Fifth, the proposed framework makes logical sense. A ruling that 
grants injunctive relief has a very concrete and significant effect on a 
party’s freedom to act. It therefore makes sense that review in that in-
stance would be governed by a lesser standard: “probable error” rather 
than “obvious error.” As noted, the Court of Appeals observed in 
Minehart that standards for granting discretionary review under subsec-
tions (b)(1) and (b)(2) create an inverse relationship between the effect of 
an order and the certainty of error.73 Moreover, it makes practical sense 
that a party adversely affected by such a ruling should be able to obtain 
review under the less stringent standard before a final judgment because 
of the potential costs and damages imposed by lengthy litigation. 
Likewise, this framework ensures that parties erroneously deprived 
of clear legal rights in litigation may obtain meaningful relief under sub-
section (b)(1). The requirement that an “obvious error . . . would render 
further proceedings useless” sensibly refers to rulings that misapply 
clearly established law to undisputed facts or that misunderstand facts in 
a manner rising to the level of reversible error. A classic example is a 
trial court ruling that erroneously denies a motion to dismiss based on 
expiration of an applicable limitation period. Regardless of any further 
developments in the litigation, the moving party is entitled to dismissal, 
and therefore, all further proceedings are useless. The same can be said 
for a party that is entitled to (but is denied) summary judgment on some 
or all issues, or where summary judgment is improperly granted. Waiting 
for a final judgment would be incredibly wasteful and ultimately point-
less. Further, the damage caused by an obviously erroneous ruling is less 
likely to be solved by a successful appeal. But given the policy against 
piecemeal appellate review, it makes sense to require demonstration of 
obvious error to obtain review of such rulings. Subsection (b)(1) pro-
vides an avenue of relief for aggrieved parties and a mechanism for ap-
pellate courts to exercise supervisory jurisdiction in appropriate circum-
stances without wasting appellate resources, creating delays through 
piecemeal appeals, or undermining the independence of trial courts. 
Sixth, this framework will bring the coherence to this aspect of ap-
pellate practice that the RAP sought to achieve because it clearly deline-
                                                 
 71. See supra text accompanying notes 53–60. 
 72. See supra text accompanying notes 11–42. 
 73. See Minehart v. Morning Star Boys Ranch, Inc., 232 P.3d 591, 594 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010). 
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ates the circumstances when discretionary review is appropriate. As it 
stands now, subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2) are frequently viewed as apply-
ing to the same types of non-final orders. That can clearly be seen in the 
secondary authorities that are cited and discussed in Part I above and in 
the many cases that are cited and discussed in Part II.A. The result is an 
appellate court system burdened by the very types of imprecise and per-
sistent requests for interlocutory review that the rules of appellate proce-
dure and the final judgment rule are intended to limit. 
Finally, the proposed framework tracks federal law, which might 
provide guidance to both jurists and practitioners alike. Federal law ex-
pressly provides a right of appeal from orders concerning preliminary 
injunctions.74 Although subsection (b)(2) does not allow appeals from 
such orders as a matter of right, its less stringent “probable error” stand-
ard corresponds to the recognition in federal law (and in the former Rules 
on Appeal) that parties should be able to obtain review of certain orders 
with relative ease. Just as a party may obtain interlocutory review in fed-
eral court by applying for a writ of mandamus upon a showing of a “clear 
and indisputable right,”75 a party may seek review under subsection 
(b)(1) upon a showing of an obvious error.76 
III. CONCLUSION 
Washington courts have strayed from the initial intent of RAP 2.3: 
to establish clear, distinct standards governing motions for discretionary 
review. Over the past three decades, courts, perhaps unwittingly, have 
collapsed the terms of subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2) into a murky analyti-
cal framework. This trend is inconsistent with the language of the rules 
                                                 
 74. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (2014), which provides, in pertinent part: 
Except as provided in subsections (c) and (d) of this section, the courts of appeals shall 
have jurisdiction of appeals from: 
(1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States, the United 
States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the District Court of 
Guam, and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, or of the judges thereof, 
granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or 
refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions, except where a direct review may 
be had in the Supreme Court; [and] 
(2) Interlocutory orders appointing receivers, or refusing orders to wind up 
receiverships or to take steps to accomplish the purposes thereof, such as 
directing sales or other disposals of property[.] 
 75. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380–81, 394 (2004). 
 76. Application for extraordinary writs in the federal context is also analogous to the standard 
of WASH. R. APP. P. 2.3(b)(3), which permits discretionary review when a “superior court has so far 
departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such a 
departure by an inferior court or administrative agency, as to call for review by the appellate court.” 
Application of this standard is not a focus of this Article. 
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and has created confused lines of case law, leaving practitioners no 
choice but to argue that review is warranted under either standard. Ap-
pellate courts should take this problem seriously and endeavor to clarify 
the appropriate standards. Limiting subsection (b)(2) to orders concern-
ing injunctions and the like—not ordinary pretrial rulings—would 
demonstrate fealty to the terms of the rules and ensure avenues for inter-
locutory review where appropriate, consistent with the final judgment 
rule. 
